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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge: 
 
After a jury trial, defendant-appellant Charles Mack 
(Mack) was convicted on one count of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)(1). Following Mack's conviction, the district court 
sentenced Mack pursuant to the enhanced penalties under 
the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(e)(1). Mack now appeals, challenging the application 
of the ACCA to his sentence. We affirm. 
 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
At approximately 8:35 a.m. on March 15, 1997, 
Philadelphia Police Officers responded to a report of gunfire 
outside an "after-hours" bar located at Frazier and Market 
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Streets in Philadelphia. Upon arriving at the scene, one of 
the officers observed Mack bent down and crouched behind 
a parked vehicle. As he approached Mack, the officer 
noticed a handgun in Mack's right hand. The officer then 
drew his sidearm and ordered Mack to put the handgun 
down. In response, Mack threw the handgun under the 
parked vehicle. One officer then handcuffed Mack and 
placed him in custody, while another retrieved the tossed 
weapon, a loaded .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun, 
from underneath the parked vehicle. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the officers encountered Gregory 
Wessels (Wessels) outside the bar. Wessels indicated to the 
officers that he had been shot in his right leg. When asked 
to identify the individual who had shot him, Wessels stated 
that it was Mack. Wessels was then transported to a local 
hospital where doctors removed a .380 caliber bullet from 
his right leg. Later that day, while in the hospital, Wessels 
again identified Mack as the shooter.2  
 
From the area outside the bar, the officers recovered 
twelve spent .380 caliber shell casings. These shell casings 
were found just a few feet away from where Mack had been 
standing and were consistent with ejection from a .380 
caliber handgun. The officers also recovered several .22 
caliber shell casings from the area and found a .22 caliber 
rifle from inside the bar. Examination and test-firing of 
Mack's .380 caliber handgun revealed that it was 
operational and contained gunshot residue in its barrel. 
After comparing the spent shell casings recovered outside 
the bar with the .380 caliber handgun in Mack's 
possession, the officers determined that the casings had 
been fired by Mack's handgun. The .380 caliber bullet 
removed from Wessels's leg was also analyzed. While the 
bullet bore insufficient markings to positively match it to 
Mack's handgun, the bullet was of the same caliber and did 
in fact have markings consistent with being fired from 
Mack's handgun. Moreover, the officers determined that 
Mack's handgun had been manufactured outside of 
Pennsylvania and had traveled in interstate commerce. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At trial, however, Wessels denied that it was Mack who shot him. 
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On June 30, 1998, a federal grand jury in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania indicted Mack under 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)3 for one count of knowingly possessing in and 
affecting interstate commerce, on or about March 15, 1997, 
a firearm, after he had been previously convicted in the 
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, 
Pennsylvania, of an unspecified felony punishable for a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year. The government's 
pretrial detention motion, filed on July 17, 1998, stated 
that Mack faced a fifteen-year minimum sentence and a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment for violating 18 
U.S.C. S 922(g). In addition, the motion mentioned six of 
Mack's prior convictions: two convictions for aggravated 
assault, one for robbery, one for possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance, and two for violating the 
Uniform Firearms Act of Pennsylvania. On August 12, 
1998, in response to defense counsel's discovery letter, the 
government provided certified copies of four of Mack's prior 
felony convictions: (1) robbery and conspiracy on November 
7, 1977; (2) aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and 
obstruction of justice on July 21, 1982; (3) aggravated 
assault and possession of an instrument of crime on 
December 11, 1985; and (4) possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance and conspiracy on April 9, 
1991. Moreover, on several occasions prior to trial, the 
government orally notified defense counsel of its intent to 
seek an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.4  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 18 U.S.C. S 922(g) provides in relevant part: 
 
       "It shall be unlawful for any person-- 
 
        (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
       imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
 
        . . . 
 
        to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess 
       in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive 
       any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported 
       in interstate or foreign commerce." 
 
4. Section 922g(1), which proscribes the offense of which Mack was 
convicted, contains no penalty provision. Section 922 is entitled 
"Unlawful acts". Section 924 is entitled "Penalties". Section 924(a)(2) 
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A two-day jury trial concluded on September 25, 1998, 
with the jury finding Mack guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g). On November 30, 1998, the Probation Office 
submitted its Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) for 
Mack's sentencing. The PSR stated that Mack was subject 
to sentencing under the ACCA and indicated that, prior to 
1997, Mack had been convicted of seven violent felonies 
and serious drug offenses in the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas: (1) robbery and conspiracy on November 7, 
1977; (2) carrying a firearm without a license on January 
17, 1980; (3) aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and 
obstruction of justice on July 21, 1982; (4) a violation of 
the Uniform Firearms Act on March 13, 1985; (5) 
aggravated assault and possession of an instrument of 
crime on December 11, 1985; (6) possession of a controlled 
substance on March 21, 1986; and (7) possession with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
provides that "[w]hoever knowingly violates subsection . . . (g) . . . of 
section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both". Section 924(e)(1), the codification of the ACCA, 
provides in relevant part: 
 
        "In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title 
       and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in 
       section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious 
drug 
       offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one 
another, 
       such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned 
       not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other 
provision 
       of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a 
       probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the 
conviction 
       under section 922(g)." 
 
Section 924(e), which specifies no maximum term of imprisonment, 
has been construed to authorize a life term. See Custis v. United States, 
114 S.Ct. 1732, 1734 (1994) ("The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 
18 U.S.C. S 924(e) (ACCA), raises the penalty for possession of a firearm 
by a felon from a maximum of 10 years . . . to a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison. . . if the 
defendant `has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or 
serious drug offense.' "); United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 168 (3d 
Cir. 
1998) (quoting the foregoing passage from Custis ); United States v. 
Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 874 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Carey, 
898 F.2d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 
843, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1741 (1988). 
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intent to deliver a controlled substance and conspiracy on 
April 9, 1991. Because he was considered an armed career 
criminal, Mack's criminal history category was VI. 5 See 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.4(c)(2). The PSR calculated Mack's total 
offense level to be thirty-four, as Mack possessed the 
handgun in connection with a crime of violence (the 
shooting of Wessels). See U.S.S.G. S 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). The 
imprisonment range for a defendant with a criminal history 
of VI and a total offense level of thirty-four is 262-327 
months. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Part A. 
 
In response to the PSR, Mack filed a pro se motion 
challenging the application of the ACCA enhancement on 
the basis that he did not receive formal pretrial notice of the 
government's intent to seek an enhanced sentence under 
the ACCA.6 However, Mack did not at any time contest the 
validity of the convictions reported in the PSR. On March 9, 
1998, the government filed a formal notice of its intention 
to seek the enhanced penalties, listing four prior 
convictions that the government was relying on to trigger 
the application of the ACCA. These were the same four prior 
convictions that were contained in the government's pretrial 
detention motion, and they correspond to the certified 
copies of conviction provided to defense counsel on August 
12, 1998 in response to defense counsel's discovery letter. 
 
On March 19, 1998, the district court conducted a 
sentencing hearing, at which the district court considered 
Mack's objection to the application of the ACCA. After 
determining that the ACCA itself does not require pretrial 
notice, the district court concluded that the only remaining 
question was whether Mack received the requisite notice to 
satisfy constitutional due process concerns. The district 
court ruled that the actual, even if not formal, written 
notice provided to Mack before trial regarding his prior 
convictions and possible sentence, the government's 
pretrial discussions with Mack's counsel regarding the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Without the application of the ACCA, Mack's criminal history score 
was nine, which falls within criminal history category IV. 
 
6. Concurrent with these objections, Mack alsofiled a pro se notice of 
appeal, which was later dismissed by this Court for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
 
                                6 
  
applicability of the ACCA and its intention to seek its 
enhanced penalties, and the formal notice Mack received in 
the PSR and the government's formal notice filed ten days 
before sentencing satisfied the requirements of due process. 
Therefore, the district court overruled Mack's notice 
objection. Mack was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)(1), and a defendant convicted under section 922(g) 
who has three previous convictions for violent felonies or 
violent drug offenses is subject to a sentence enhancement 
under the ACCA and is deemed "an armed career criminal" 
under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.4(a). The district court found that 
Mack qualified as an armed career criminal under the 
ACCA. The district court also concluded that Mack used or 
possessed the handgun in the commission of a violent 
felony, the shooting of Wessels. Accordingly, the district 
court sentenced Mack to 262 months of imprisonment,five 
years of supervised release, and a special assessment of 
$100. Mack filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
Discussion 
 
On appeal, Mack asserts the following points of error: (1) 
the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under the 
ACCA in the absence of formal pretrial notice of the 
government's intention to seek enhancement and of the 
specific prior convictions supporting its application; (2) the 
district court's finding that Mack used or possessed a 
firearm in connection with a crime of violence was 
erroneous because it was based on a preponderance of 
evidence standard rather than the required and higher 
"clear and convincing" evidence standard; and (3) the 
evidence was insufficient to support the district court's 
finding that Mack used or possessed a firearm in 
connection with a crime of violence. We consider these 
issues in that order. 
 
I. Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence Under the ACCA 
 
Mack did not challenge the validity of the convictions 
supporting the application of the ACCA before the district 
court. On appeal, Mack does not assert that he was 
provided insufficient time to contest these prior convictions 
nor claims that the district court's finding that he qualified 
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as an armed career criminal was erroneous. Instead, 
pointing to the importance of pretrial knowledge of the 
applicability of the ACCA in deciding whether to plead 
guilty or to go to trial, he contends that his due process 
rights were violated by the application of the ACCA, 
because he did not receive formal, pretrial notice of the 
government's intent to seek an enhanced sentence under 
the ACCA and of the particular prior convictions that would 
underlie the application of the ACCA. Accordingly, Mack 
concludes that the ACCA cannot be constitutionally applied 
to him. We disagree. 
 
As Mack concedes, the ACCA does not require formal, 
pretrial notice. See United States v. Mauldin , 109 F.3d 
1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hardy, 52 F.3d 
147, 150 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Craveiro, 907 
F.2d 260, 262 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, only notice necessary 
to satisfy constitutional due process requirements need be 
given. This Court reviews de novo Mack's assertion that his 
due process rights were violated. See United States v. 
Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In Oyler v. Boles, 82 S.Ct. 501 (1962), the Supreme Court 
stated that "due process does not require advance notice 
that the trial on the substantive offense will be followed by 
an habitual criminal proceeding." Id. at 504. "Nevertheless, 
a defendant must receive reasonable notice and an 
opportunity to be heard relative to the recidivist charge 
even if due process does not require that notice be given 
prior to the trial on the substantive offense." Id. at 504. The 
ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute and does not 
create a separate offense.7 See United States v. Hawkins, 
811 F.2d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 1987). See also United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Mack does not contend otherwise. Neither Jones v. United States, 526 
U.S. 227 (1999) nor Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000) is to 
the contrary; neither involved prior conviction enhancement, and the 
Court noted in Apprendi "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
at 2362-63 (emphasis added). And, Mack has never contended that 
absent a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt of his ACCA predicate 
prior convictions that his statutory maximum sentence could not exceed 
ten years or was other than life imprisonment. 
 
                                8 
  
Henry, 933 F.2d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
S.Ct. 1703, (1992); United States v. Afflek , 861 F.2d 97, 99 
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1325 (1989). In 
Hawkins, this Court held that the government'sfiling notice 
of its intent to request an enhanced sentence under the 
ACCA, which included a list of the accused's prior 
convictions, satisfied due process. See id. However, we 
declined to determine to what extent, if any, notice by the 
government of its intention to seek enhanced penalties 
under the ACCA is constitutionally required. See id. Every 
circuit that has addressed the issue has concluded that 
formal, pretrial notice is not constitutionally mandated. See 
United States v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 125 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 120 S.Ct. 422 (1999); Mauldin, 109 F.3d at 1163; 
United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 625-26 (11th Cir. 
1995); Hardy, 52 F.3d at 150; Craveiro , 907 F.2d at 264- 
65. We agree and hold that due process does not require 
the government to provide formal, pretrial notice of its 
intention to seek a sentence under the ACCA. 
 
Although Mack did not receive formal notice by the 
government that he could be sentenced as an armed career 
criminal until ten days before the day of sentencing, he 
received actual notice well before trial. More than two 
months before trial, the government filed its pretrial 
detention motion that listed six of Mack's previous 
convictions: robbery in 1977, aggravated assault in 1982, a 
Uniform Firearms Act violation in 1980, aggravated assault 
in 1982, a Uniform Firearms Act violation in 1985, 
aggravated assault in 1985, and possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance in 1991. This pretrial motion 
also stated that Mack was subject to a mandatory 
minimum term of fifteen years' imprisonment, with the 
possible maximum penalty life imprisonment. In addition, 
more than one month before trial, the government provided 
defense counsel with certified copies of four of the six 
convictions listed in the pretrial detention motion. Mack 
and the government agree that prior to trial, the 
government orally informed Mack that he could be 
sentenced as an armed career criminal. 
 
We conclude that Mack received constitutionally 
adequate notice. First, the government provided him with 
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actual notice prior to trial, including certified copies of the 
relevant prior convictions. Second, three and a half months 
before sentencing, Mack received the PSR, which stated 
that Mack was subject to being sentenced under the 
ACCA's enhancement provisions and specified the prior 
convictions that qualified him for that enhancement (as well 
as other convictions on which the ACCA's application might 
have been based). Third, the government filed an additional 
notice ten days before sentencing formally notifying Mack 
that he could be sentenced as an armed career criminal. 
Therefore, Mack received more than sufficient notice of the 
possibility of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA. See 
United States v. Rundle, 318 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 1963) ("[I]t 
is well settled that while a defendant `must receive 
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to 
the recidivist charge' that `due process does not require 
advance notice that the trial on the substantive offense will 
be followed by an habitual criminal accusation.' ") (quoting 
Oyler, 82 S.Ct. at 504); see also Hardy, 52 F.3d at 150 
(finding that the following met due process notice 
requirements: actual, informal notice; receipt of the PSR 
listing all prior convictions and stating the ACCA's 
applicability; and an additional formal notice just before 
sentencing). 
 
In conclusion, Mack had sufficient opportunity to contest 
the earlier convictions and their applicability to his 
sentence. He chose not to do so. Moreover, Mack makes no 
claim of factual surprise of either the government's decision 
to seek an enhanced sentence under the ACCA or the 
convictions supporting the application of the ACCA. Formal 
pretrial notice by the government would certainly do no 
harm, and, given the importance of pretrial knowledge of 
the ACCA's applicability to the decision whether to plead 
guilty or to go to trial, we recommend it as the preferred 
practice. However, it is not constitutionally mandated for 
good reason, because "the fact of prior conviction is within 
the knowledge of the defendant." Oyler, 82 S.Ct. at 504 n.6. 
The notice given Mack more than satisfied due process 
requirements. 
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II. Appropriate Standard for Factfinding at Sentencing 
 
In determining Mack's sentence, the application of the 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. SS 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and 
4B1.4(c)(2) for Mack's use or possession of thefirearm in 
connection with a crime of violence--his shooting Wessels-- 
resulted in an offense level increase from thirty-three to 
thirty-four and a criminal history category increase from 
category IV to category VI, with a corresponding guideline 
imprisonment range increase from a range of 188 to 235 
months to a range of 262 to 327 months.8  Relying on this 
Court's holding in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 
1084 (3d Cir. 1990), Mack asserts that the ACCA 
enhancement was so substantial that it requires the district 
court to find by clear and convincing evidence that he shot 
Wessels, instead of only by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the latter being the test apparently employed by 
the district court.9 We disagree. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. U.S.S.G. S 4B1.4 provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
"Armed Career Criminal 
 
       (a) A defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence under the 
       provisions of 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) is an armed career criminal. 
 
       (b) The offense level for an armed career criminal is the greatest 
of: 
 
       * * * * * * 
 
       (3)(A) 34, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or 
       ammunition in connection with a crime of violence . . . or 
 
       (B) 33, otherwise. 
 
       (c) The criminal history for an armed career criminal is the 
greatest 
       of: 
 
       * * * * * * 
 
       (1) the criminal history category from Chapter Four, Part A 
       (Criminal History), . . . ; or 
 
       (2) Category VI, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or 
       ammunition in connection with a crime of violence. .. ." 
9. The district court stated "To apply this section [S 4B1.4], it is 
enough 
that the government prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. 
Mack possessed or used the gun in connection with a crime of violence, 
it is not required to prove that he was convicted of a crime of violence." 
This was said, however, in connection with rejecting Mack's argument 
"that because he was convicted only of possessing a firearm and not of 
any crime of violence these [guideline] subsections do not apply to him." 
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The government normally bears the burden of proving 
facts relevant to sentencing by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545 
(3d Cir. 1993). "This is because after a juryfinds a 
defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence no longer 
applies, and the protections that form a corollary to that 
presumption become less important." United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1409 (3d Cir. 1994). In Kikumura, 
however, this Court held that, under certain circumstances, 
a higher standard of proof may be required. See Kikumura, 
918 F.2d at 1098. Kikumura was convicted of twelve counts 
of passport and weapons offenses, which resulted in an 
imprisonment range of 27-33 months under the Sentencing 
Guidelines. See id. at 1093-94. The district court concluded 
that Kikumura's actions were significantly more serious 
than his convictions and the corresponding guideline range 
indicated. See id. at 1097. The district court, therefore, 
imposed an upward departure on several bases, including 
Kikumura's intent to cause multiple deaths and serious 
injuries, his planned detonation of unusually dangerous 
explosives, his intent to disrupt governmental functions, 
and the endangerment of public safety and national 
security. See id. at 1097-98. The district court upwardly 
departed from Kikumura's original sentencing range of 27- 
33 months to a term of 360 months' imprisonment--a 330- 
month upward departure from the median of the applicable 
guideline range of 27-33 months. See id. at 1098. When 
making its findings at sentencing, the district court 
employed the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Although recognizing this standard as "overwhelmingly" 
predominant, this Court held that under the circumstances 
of a "twelve-fold, 330-month departure from the median of 
the applicable guideline range" the clear and convincing 
standard was required in light of 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b)'s10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b) provides in relevant part: 
 
        "The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the 
       range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that 
       there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 
or 
       to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
       Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 
       result in a sentence different from that described. . . ." 
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directive that the sentencing court "find" certain 
considerations to justify a departure. Id. at 1101-02; see id. 
at 1101 ("[When a departure] is sufficiently great that the 
sentencing hearing can be fairly characterized as`a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense,' . . . the 
factfinding underlying that departure must be established 
at least by clear and convincing evidence.") (quoting 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2417 (1986)). 
 
Kikumura's heightened standard has been applied in 
other circumstances, albeit only to similarly extreme 
upward departures. See United States v. Pastor , 173 F.3d 
206, 216 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the clear and convincing 
standard when reviewing a nine-level upward departure 
that increased the guideline range from 108-135 months to 
292-365 months); Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1409-10 (concluding 
that an upward departure, resulting in a fifty-fold, $6.875 
million increase of a defendant's fine, warranted the clear 
and convincing standard of proof); United States v. Seale, 
20 F.3d 1279, 1288 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding the clear and 
convincing standard governed a seven-fold, $1.5 million 
upward departure from the maximum fine under the 
applicable guidelines range). Other decisions have 
considered sentencing increases that have not warranted 
such a heightened evidentiary standard. See, e.g., Paulino, 
996 F.2d at 1545 & n.4 (reasoning that the calculation of 
the amount of narcotics attributable to the defendant, and 
the resulting increase in his sentence, did not warrant the 
utilization of the clear and convincing standard); United 
States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 458-59 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(departing upward from a 15-21 month range to a 27- 
month term of imprisonment); see also United States v. 
Ruggiero, 100 F.3d 284, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to 
require clear and convincing evidence where enhancements 
raised the defendants's offense levels by eight levels each); 
United States v. Rodriguez, 67 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (7th Cir. 
1995) (declining to require clear and convincing evidence 
for attributing 1,000 kilograms of marijuana to the 
defendant); United States v. Arango-Montoya, 61 F.3d 1331, 
1339 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the clear and convincing 
standard where the defendant's status as a prior drug 
offender increased his sentence from a range of 63-78 
months' imprisonment to a term of 120 months); United 
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States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard was appropriate where the defendant's sentence 
was increased from 115 months to 168 months, reflecting 
a six-level difference in offense level); United States v. 
Schuster, 948 F.2d 313, 315-16 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) (the 
difference between the 21-27 month guideline range and 
the 60-month sentence imposed pursuant to a statutory 
mandatory minimum was not so dramatic as to mandate a 
higher standard of proof). The application of S 4B1.4 on 
account of Mack's use or possession of the firearm in 
connection with a crime of violence raised Mack's 
applicable guideline imprisonment range from 188 to 235 
months to 262 to 327 months. This resulted in an 83- 
month, or approximately thirty-nine percent, increase from 
the median sentence of the guideline range. Mack's actual 
sentence of 262 months was 27 months, or just under 
twelve percent, longer than the maximum guideline 
sentence absent that enhancement; the enhancement 
raised the bottom of the guideline range by some 74 
months, or about thirty-nine percent. Even assuming 
arguendo that Kikumura's teachings apply in contexts other 
than upward departures,11 the increase in Mack's sentence 
does not approach the 330-month, twelve-fold increase in 
Kikumura or the 207-month, three-fold increase in Pastor. 
Rather, it more closely resembles those cases rejecting the 
heightened burden of proof. Accordingly, the clear and 
convincing standard of proof is not compelled, and we 
review the government's proof at sentencing under the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.12  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Eighth Circuit has suggested that a heightened standard may be 
applicable, in certain extreme circumstances, when determining the 
amount of drugs attributable to a defendant convicted of violating a drug 
statute. See United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1991); 
but see Rodriguez, 67 F.3d at 1323 (intimating that Kikumura's 
heightened scrutiny of departures from the sentencing range provided 
under the guidelines may not lend itself to the guidelines themselves). 
 
12. We do not believe that Apprendi, see note 7, supra, requires a 
different result. Apprendi is concerned with when a fact becomes an 
element of the offense so as to require its determination by a jury and 
on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Mack has not taken the 
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III. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the ACCA's 
       Application 
 
In his third claim of error, Mack contends that the 
evidence does not support the district court's finding that 
he possessed a firearm in connection with a crime of 
violence. Specifically, Mack asserts that the evidence was 
insufficient for the district court to conclude that he shot 
Wessels. As noted in Part II, the district court'sfinding on 
this matter must be supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence. This Court reviews the district court'sfindings of 
fact for clear error. See United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 
442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999). We conclude that the district court 
did not clearly err in determining that Mack possessed the 
handgun in connection with a crime of violence. Indeed the 
evidence supporting that finding is more than ample. 
 
Mack does not dispute that he possessed the .380 caliber 
handgun, or that shooting someone with it is a crime of 
violence.13 Rather, Mack argues that the evidence does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
position before this Court that his shooting of Wessels with the weapon 
was an element of the offense which had to be found by the jury or that 
it had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Quite the contrary, 
his argument here proceeds on the basis that it is a sentencing factor for 
determination by the court at sentencing under a"clear and convincing" 
evidence standard. Moreover, he argues that his sentence should have 
been within the guideline range of 188-235 months, which necessarily 
assumes that the relevant statutory maximum sentence was not the ten 
years provided for in S 924(a)(2) but rather life imprisonment as provided 
in S 924(e). See U.S.S.G. S 5G1.1(c)(1) (guideline sentence may not exceed 
statutory maximum). While we doubtless have the authority to notice 
"plain error"--cf. Fed.R. Crim. Proc. 52(b)--in an appropriate 
circumstance, no such error is shown here. What was before the Court 
in Apprendi were facts (other than the fact of prior conviction) "that 
increase[ ] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum." Id., 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. That is not the case here, where 
the statutory maximum is life imprisonment (see notes 4 and 7, supra). 
We can find no "plain error" here. See, e.g., United States v. Aguayo- 
Delgado, 2000 WL 988128 (8th Cir., July 18, 2000); United States v. 
Meshack, 2000 WL 1218437 at n.18 (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2000). 
 
13. U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(a) provides as follows: 
 
"S 4B1.2. Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1 
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support the conclusion that he shot Wessels for three 
reasons: (1) Wessels testified at trial that Mack was not the 
shooter; (2) the testimony of the firearms expert did not 
positively identify the bullet removed from Wessels's leg as 
having come from Mack's handgun;14 and (3) there was no 
evidence on the number of guns and persons involved in 
the shooting outside the bar. We disagree. 
 
Mack was in possession of a .380 caliber handgun 
outside the bar, and Wessels was found by the officers 
outside the bar with a gunshot wound in his right leg from 
a .380 caliber bullet. Twelve fired .380 caliber shells were 
lying on the ground in the area where Mack was standing 
and were the only .380 caliber shells recovered from the 
crime scene. All twelve shells were positively matched with 
Mack's .380 caliber handgun which was found to be 
operational and to contain gunshot residue in its chamber. 
Although the bullet removed from Wessels's leg bore 
insufficient markings to make a positive match with Mack's 
handgun, it was of the corresponding caliber and had 
markings consistent with it being fired from Mack's 
handgun. Moreover, twice on the day he was shot, Wessels 
made statements to the police that Mack was the gunman, 
although Wessels's subsequent testimony contradicted 
those statements. Under these facts, the district court did 
not err in concluding that Mack shot Wessels. The shooting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (a) The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or 
       state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
       year, that-- 
 
       (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
       of physical force against the person of another, or 
 
       (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
       explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
       serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 
 
Mack's asserted shooting of Wessels is clearly covered by S 4B1.2(a)(1). 
 
14. Officer Ernest Bottomer, the firearms expert, testified that the 
bullet 
removed from Wessels's leg had probably struck bone or another foreign 
object, thereby damaging the bullet's condition and preventing a positive 
match. 
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of Wessels constitutes a crime of violence, and Mack used 
or possessed a firearm in connection with that crime. 
Accordingly, the district court properly applied U.S.S.G. 
SS 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and 4B1.4(c)(2) in setting Mack's offense 
level at thirty-four and his criminal history category at VI. 
Mack has not established that the district court committed 
clear error. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We find no error in the district court's application of the 
ACCA to Mack's sentence. Mack's conviction and sentence 
are 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, concurring. 
 
I join in Judge Garwood's fine opinion. I write separately 
because of the implications of his footnote 12, which deals 
with the potential impact on this case of the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. 
Ct. 2348 (2000). Apprendi declared that"[o]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 6362-63. Viewed through the 
lens of the separate opinions of Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
O'Connor, and Breyer, see infra at 19-20, Apprendi's 
implications for the legitimacy of a variety of sentencing 
schemes, including the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, have stirred enormous controversy, portending 
that the number of Apprendi challenges by incarcerated 
defendants will soon reach tidal proportions.1 While I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. One writer has suggested that thirty-nine federal and twenty state 
criminal statutes may be unconstitutional under Apprendi. See Brooke 
A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing, Wash. Post, July 
23, 2000, at A1 (citing work of Professor Susan Klein); see generally 
Lewis J. Liman, Initial Thoughts on `Apprendi v. New Jersey,' N.Y.L.J., 
July 5, 2000, at 3 ("[T]he Court's decision has the potential to reopen 
the 
question of the constitutionality of the [sentencing] guidelines 
themselves 
. . . ."); Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel, Court's Apprendi Hate Crimes 
Decision May Have Broad Impact on Sentencing, The Legal Intelligencer, 
June 28, 2000, at 4 (quoting John Steer, member of the United States 
Sentencing Commission, as stating that Apprendi  will require the 
Commission to cull "through guidelines, almost guideline by guideline 
and offense by offense" to determine which portions comply with the 
decision). Apprendi most obviously implicates federal drug sentences 
because in such cases it is common for the judge, rather than the jury, 
to determine (and sentence based on) the quantity of drugs possessed. 
Over 41% of all federal convictions in fiscal year 1999--more than 
23,000--were for drug offenses. See United States Sentencing 
Commission, 1999 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, at 11. 
Federal courts have been sentencing defendants under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines since November 1987, and hence they will no 
doubt soon be required to grapple with the question whether Apprendi 
applies retroactively on collateral review. The Clerk of this Court has 
informed me that this Court has received seventeen applications to file 
a second or successive habeas petition raising Apprendi issues during 
the past six weeks. I have also been told that Apprendi is cited in nine 
of the last thirteen such petitions that have been received, and that two 
of the four that do not directly cite Apprendi raise possible Apprendi-
like 
issues. 
                                 18 
  
ultimately conclude that we need not and should not reach 
the Apprendi issue in this case, the merits of that point 
seem to me to be close. I therefore take this opportunity: (1) 
to explain why the question is difficult; and (2) to identify 
one critical Apprendi concern that is created by the unique 
intersection between the Armed Career Criminal Act of 
1984 ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. S 924(e), and the Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
 
I. 
 
Charles Apprendi fired several shots "into the home of an 
African-American family that had recently moved into a 
previously all-white neighborhood." 120 S. Ct. at 2351. The 
State of New Jersey charged him with, and Apprendi pled 
guilty to, inter alia, two counts of second-degree possession 
of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. See id.  at 2352. The 
maximum sentence for this crime under New Jersey law 
was ten years in prison. See id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2C:32-6(a)(2)). Nevertheless, the trial court sentenced 
Apprendi to twelve years in prison, relying on a statute that 
allowed for an "enhanced" sentence of up to twenty years if 
the sentencing judge found that "[t]he defendant in 
committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an 
individual or group of individuals because of race .. . ." Id. 
at 2351-52 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:44-3(e)). The 
Supreme Court of the United States reversed Apprendi's 
sentence, holding that "[t]he New Jersey procedure 
challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from 
the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our 
criminal justice system." Id. at 2366. 
 
While Apprendi itself concerned only the New Jersey hate 
crime statute, there are numerous suggestions in the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions that the 
case's scope may be quite broad indeed. Justice Thomas's 
concurrence argued that any fact that alters the range of 
punishments to which a defendant is exposed must be 
found by a jury, see id. at 2379-80, acknowledging that his 
proposed rule might invalidate the Sentencing Guidelines 
themselves. See id. at 2380 n.11. Justice Scalia's 
concurrence maintained that "all the facts which must exist 
in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed 
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punishment must be found by the jury." Id. at 2367. 
Justice O'Connor's dissent expressed concern that the 
Court's holding "will have the effect of invalidating 
significant sentencing reform accomplished over the past 
three decades." Id. at 2394. And Justice Breyer, a key 
figure in the development of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
lamented that "the rationale that underlies the Court's rule 
suggests a principle . . . that, unless restricted, threatens 
the workability of every criminal justice system (if applied to 
judges) or threatens efforts to make those systems more 
uniform, hence more fair (if applied to [sentencing] 
commissions)." Id. at 2402. 
 
The majority responded to these allegations simply by 
noting that "[t]he Guidelines are, of course, not before the 
Court. We therefore express no view on the subject beyond 
what this Court has already held. See, e.g., Edwards v. 
United States . . . ." Id. at 2366 n.21. Edwards, the only 
case cited by the majority, was quoted for the proposition 
that "a maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher 
sentence set forth in the Guidelines." 523 U.S. 511, 515 
(1998). The Court did not cite Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361 (1989), the case that originally upheld the 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
II. 
 
A jury convicted Charles Mack of one count of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)(1) [hereinafter "the felon-in-possession statute"]. 
Section 924 (captioned "Penalties") contains the penalty 
provisions for the offenses contained in Section 922. 
Section 924(a)(2) states that "[w]hoever knowingly violates 
[the felon-in-possession statute] shall befined as provided 
in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." 
The ACCA, codified at Section 924(e), provides that "[i]n the 
case of a person who violates [the felon-in-possession 
statute] and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent 
felony . . . such person shall be fined not more than 
$25,000 and imprisoned no less than fifteen years . . . ." 
While the statutory text provides only that violators shall be 
"imprisoned not less than fifteen years," the Supreme Court 
has construed this language as authorizing a life sentence. 
 
                                20 
  
See Curtis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). It is 
important to note, as Judge Garwood recognizes, that"[t]he 
ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute and does not 
create a separate offense." Slip. op. at 10; see also Curtis, 
511 U.S. at 490 (holding that the ACCA "provides an 
enhanced sentence" for persons found to meet its criteria) 
(emphasis added). 
 
The District Court sentenced Mack to 262 months in 
prison. This sentence was the result of the combination of 
two sentence enhancements found by the District Court 
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. The first 
enhancement, which I will refer to as "the ACCA 
enhancement," applied because Mack was "subject to an 
enhanced sentence under the provisions" of the ACCA. 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.4(a) (defining such an individual as "an 
armed career criminal"); id. S 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) (mandating that 
the offense level for any "armed career criminal" shall be no 
less than 33); id. S 4B1.4(c)(3) (enhancing the criminal 
history rating for all "armed career criminal[s]" to at least 
Category IV). A simple finding that Mack was an armed 
career criminal would have, without more, raised his 
sentencing range under the Guidelines to between 188 and 
235 months. See id. S 5A. 
 
The second enhancement, which I will henceforth refer to 
as the "crime of violence enhancement," applied because 
the District Court concluded that, in addition to being an 
"armed career criminal," Mack had also "possessed [a] 
firearm . . . . in connection with a crime of violence," i.e., 
the shooting of Gregory Wessels. Id. S 4B1.4(b)(3)(A);2 
S 4B1.4.c.2.3 This enhancement further raised Mack's 
potential sentence to between 262 and 327 months. See id. 
S 5A.4 As noted above, the District Court ultimately 
sentenced Mack to serve 262 months in prison. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) provides that "[t]he offense level for any armed 
career criminal" shall be no less than "34, if the defendant used or 
possessed the firearm . . . in connection with a crime of violence." 
3. Section 4B1.4(c)(2) states that "[t]he criminal history category of an 
armed career criminal" shall be no less than"Category VI, if the 
defendant used or possessed the firearm . . . in connection with a crime 
of violence." 
4. The Sentencing Table contained in Section 5A gives a sentencing 
range of between 262 and 327 months for an offender with an offense 
level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI. 
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III. 
 
The Apprendi inquiry has two stages. A court must first 
determine the "prescribed statutory maximum" sentence for 
the crime of which the defendant was convicted and assess 
whether the defendant's ultimate sentence exceeded it. If it 
did, the court must consider the second-order Apprendi 
question: whether the enhanced sentence was based on 
"the fact of a prior conviction." If it was, then the sentence 
is constitutional.5 If it was not, then the sentence is 
unconstitutional. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is not clear how long this will be the case. The "fact of a prior 
conviction" exception to Apprendi's general rule is based on the Supreme 
Court's 1998 decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224, which held that no constitutional violation occurs when a judge, 
rather than a jury, increases a criminal sentence beyond the otherwise 
prescribed statutory maximum based on the fact of prior convictions. 
While Apprendi incorporated the Almendarez-Torres holding into its own, 
see 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added), the Apprendi majority went out of 
its way to cast the future viability of Almendarez-Torres into question. 
See id. at 2362 ("Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was 
incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today 
should apply if the recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not 
contest the decision's validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of 
our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the general 
rule we recalled at the outset."). Moreover, as commentators have noted, 
five sitting Justices are now on record as saying that Almendarez-Torres 
was wrongly decided. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., joined by 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissenting). 
 
I do not suggest that we should predict that the Court will overturn 
Almendarez-Torres. Cf. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) 
("Despite what Chief Judge Posner aptly described as Albrecht's 
`infirmities, [and] its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations,' 
there 
remains the question whether Albrecht deserves continuing respect 
under the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court of Appeals was correct in 
applying that principle despite disagreement with Albrecht, for it is this 
Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.") (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). But the apprehension remains. 
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A. 
 
In his footnote dealing with the Apprendi issue in this 
case, Judge Garwood resolves the inquiry at stage one, 
stating that "[w]hat was before the Court in Apprendi were 
facts (other than the fact of prior conviction)`that increase[ ] 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum.' [Citing Apprendi]. That is not the case here, 
where the statutory maximum is life imprisonment. (see 
note 4 and 7, supra)." Slip op. at 14-15 n.12. I am not so 
sure. 
 
What was the prescribed statutory maximum in this 
case? There are two possibilities. The first and most 
obvious answer is 120 months. The jury convicted Mack of 
violating the felon-in-possession statute; he was not 
charged with, nor convicted of, any other crime. The 
maximum possible sentence for violating the felon-in- 
possession statute simpliciter is 120 months. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 942(a)(2). Thus, if Mack's prescribed statutory maximum 
was set at the time of the jury's verdict, then his ultimate 
sentence of 262 months exceeded it, and the first stage of 
the Apprendi inquiry should be resolved in Mack's favor. 
 
The other possibility, which Judge Garwood endorses, is 
that the prescribed statutory maximum in this case was life 
imprisonment, i.e., the maximum sentence statutorily 
authorized by the ACCA. See Curtis, 511 U.S. at 487. If this 
is true, then Apprendi is not implicated because Mack's 
ultimate sentence (262 months) was within the prescribed 
statutory maximum. 
 
1. 
 
While not spelled out in his opinion in these terms, 
Judge Garwood's position appears to be as follows: (1) a 
jury convicted Mack of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm in violation of the felon-in-possession statute; (2) 
the ACCA applies "[i]n the case of a person who violates 
[the felon-in-possession statute] and has three previous 
convictions . . . for a violent felony;" (3) under Apprendi, the 
District Court (rather than a jury) was entitled tofind that 
Mack "ha[d] three previous convictions . . . for a violent 
felony," and thus to sentence Mack under the ACCA; (4) the 
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ACCA statutorily authorizes a life sentence; (5) the 
prescribed statutory maximum in this case was thus life 
imprisonment; and, therefore, (6) Mack's ultimate sentence 
of 262 months was within the prescribed statutory 
maximum and Apprendi is not implicated. 
 
While not without force, this approach to determining a 
prescribed statutory maximum is in tension with the 
methodology applied by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. 
Demonstrating why this is so requires a comparison of the 
sentencing mechanics at issue in this case with those at 
issue in Apprendi: 
 
(1) Apprendi was "convicted of possession of afirearm for 
       an unlawful purpose." Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351. 
       Mack was convicted of knowingly violating the felon-in- 
       possession statute; 
 
(2) Absent any additional findings by the trial court, the 
       maximum sentence that Apprendi faced would have 
       been ten years in prison. See id. Absent any additional 
       findings by the District Court, the maximum sentence 
       that Mack faced would have been ten years in prison. 
       See 18 U.S.C. S 924(a)(2); 
 
(3) New Jersey law provided that the trial court was 
       required to sentence Apprendi to "an extended term" of 
       up to twenty years if it found that he "acted with a 
       purpose to intimidate an individual . . . because of 
       race." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:44-3(e); see id. S 2C-43- 
       7(a)(3) (providing that the extended term for a person 
       convicted by a jury of a "crime of the second degree" 
       shall be "between 10 and 20 years"). The ACCA 
       provides that the District Court was required to 
       sentence Mack to an "enhanced sentence" of up to life 
       imprisonment, see Curtis, 511 U.S. at 487, 490, if it 
       found that he "ha[d] three previous convictions . . . for 
       a violent felony." 18 U.S.C. S 924(e)(1); 
 
(4) The New Jersey trial court found that Apprendi had 
       committed his crime "with a purpose to intimidate" and 
       sentenced him to a "12-year term of imprisonment," 
       which was 2 years longer than Apprendi could have 
       been sentenced to serve but for the "purpose to 
       intimidate" finding. 120 S. Ct. at 2352. The District 
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       Court found that Mack "ha[d] three previous 
       convictions . . . for a violent felony" and sentenced him 
       to serve 262 months (or 21 years and 10 months) in 
       prison, which was 11 years and 10 months longer than 
       Mack could have been sentenced to serve but for the 
       "three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony" 
       finding; 
 
(5) Apprendi held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
       conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
       crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
       be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
       reasonable doubt." 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The 
       Supreme Court held that Apprendi's sentence violated 
       this constitutional rule. See id. at 2363. For the Court 
       to do so, it needed to conclude that the "purpose to 
       intimidate" finding "increase[d] the penalty for 
       [Apprendi's] crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
       maximum." But if the New Jersey trial court's"purpose 
       to intimidate" finding increased Apprendi's sentence 
       beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, then the 
       District Court's "three previous convictions . . . for a 
       violent felony" finding did the same to Mack--the 
       mechanics are identical. 
 
2. 
 
There are, to be sure, some differences between Apprendi 
and this case, but these differences are not material to the 
determination of the prescribed statutory maximum 
sentence. The first difference exists in the wording of the 
statutes. Apprendi was convicted of possession of afirearm 
with an unlawful purpose, which is defined as a"crime of 
the second degree." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:39:4(a). Under New 
Jersey law, a "crime of the second degree" carries a 
potential sentence of "between five and 10 years." Id. 
S 2C:43-6. Nevertheless, a different provision of the New 
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice states that a trial court 
shall sentence a defendant to "an extended term" if it finds 
that the defendant "acted with a purpose to intimidate." Id. 
at 2C:44-3. Thus, the base level sentence for a second 
degree offense is provided in Section 2C:43-6 and Section 
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2C:44-3 overtly purports to authorize "an extended term" 
above and beyond that base sentence. 
 
Title 18 of the United States Code operates somewhat 
differently. Mack's substantive offense was violating the 
felon-in-possession statute. Section 924 provides two 
different sentencing options for such a person. Section 
924(a)(2) provides that "[w]hoever knowingly violates [the 
felon-in-possession statute] shall be . . . imprisoned not 
more than 10 years." The ACCA, Section 924(e)(2), provides 
that "[i]n the case of a person who violates[the felon-in- 
possession statute] and has three previous convictions . . . 
for a violent felony," the minimum sentence shall be fifteen 
years and the maximum shall be life imprisonment. Neither 
Section 924(a)(2) nor the ACCA contain any reference to the 
other. 
 
In light of this juxtaposition, one could argue that while 
New Jersey law required a trial court to impose a base 
sentence and then to extend it after concluding that the 
defendant had acted with a "purpose to intimidate," federal 
law requires no such thing. Instead, the argument would 
go, a district court faced with a defendant who has been 
convicted of violating the felon-in-possession statute needs 
only to determine whether Section 924(a)(2) or the ACCA 
provides the appropriate sentence. And if the court 
concludes that the defendant "has three previous 
convictions . . . for a violent felony," the argument 
continues, it should bypass Section 924(a)(2) altogether and 
instead sentence under the ACCA. Under this 
interpretation, the ACCA did not enhance Mack's sentence, 
it simply determined his sentence, as though Section 
924(a)(2) began with the words "except as otherwise 
provided in Section 924(e)." 
 
However, this argument, which I acknowledge is not 
without force, appears foreclosed by Apprendi  as well. In 
responding to New Jersey's claim that the "purpose to 
intimidate" finding was merely a "sentencing factor" (that 
may be found by a judge) rather than an "element" (that 
must be found by a jury), the Court emphasized that"the 
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect--does the 
required finding expose the defendant to a greater 
punishment than authorized by the jury's guilty verdict 
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alone?" 120 S. Ct. at 2365. Under this standard, it does not 
matter whether the ACCA is drafted in such a way as to 
"bypass" Section 924(a)(2). The question is whether the 
District Court's finding that Mack "ha[d] three previous 
convictions . . . for a violent felony" exposed him "to a 
greater punishment than authorized by the jury's guilty 
verdict alone." Based on the jury's guilty verdict alone, the 
longest sentence that Mack could have faced was ten years, 
but he was sentenced to serve over twenty years. As a 
result, the first Apprendi question cuts in Mack's favor.6 
 
The second difference between this case and Apprendi is 
likewise irrelevant to the determination whether the"three 
previous convictions . . . for a violent felony"finding 
increased Mack's sentence beyond the "prescribed statutory 
maximum." In Apprendi, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
the Constitution allows a judge to increase a defendant's 
sentence "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" 
based on "the fact of a prior conviction." 120 S. Ct. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. This view is supported by the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United 
States v. Nordby, No. 99-10191, 2000 WL 1277211 (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 
2000). Nordby held "that the amount of drugs for which a defendant is 
sentenced under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1) is" a fact that "increases the 
prescribed statutory maximum penalty to which a criminal defendant is 
exposed." Id. at *1. Nordby was convicted by manufacturing marijuana 
and possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute it under Section 
841(a). The district court instructed the jury that"the government [was] 
not required to prove the amount or quantity of marijuana manufactured 
as long as the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant manufactured a measurable or detectable amount of 
marijuana." Id. Nordby was convicted by the jury and sentenced to life 
imprisonment by the court. See id. Section 841(a) defines the 
substantive offense without specifying a penalty. Section 841(b) 
enumerates numerous potential penalties for violating Section 841(a) 
which depend on the quantity of particular drugs manufactured or 
possessed. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that "Section 841 
contains `no prescribed statutory maximum,' and that therefore Apprendi 
does not apply to Nordby's case," noting that "Apprendi makes clear that 
the `prescribed statutory maximum' refers simply to the punishment to 
which the defendant is exposed solely under the facts found by the jury." 
Id. at *4. Because, absent a quantity finding, the maximum sentence 
that would have been authorized by Section 841(b) was five years in 
prison, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Norby's life sentence exceeded 
the prescribed statutory maximum. See id. at *4. 
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2362-63 (emphasis added). While this exception could not 
save the trial court's finding in Apprendi's case, which was 
based on the "fact" that he had acted with a"purpose to 
intimidate," see id. at 2363, it might save the enhancement 
in this case, which was based on the fact that Mack"ha[d] 
three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony." The 
possibility, however, does nothing to change the fact that 
the "three previous convictions" finding enhanced Mack's 
sentence beyond the "prescribed statutory maximum;" it 
simply raises the possibility that in this case the 
enhancement was constitutional. In other words, while this 
difference between Apprendi and this case may affect the 
outcome of the second-order Apprendi question, it is 
irrelevant to the resolution of the first. 
 
In sum, I conclude that the District Court's finding, 
pursuant to the ACCA, that Mack "ha[d] three previous 
convictions . . . for a violent felony" increased his sentence 
beyond the "prescribed statutory maximum" as defined in 
Apprendi. 
 
B. 
 
If the foregoing is true, Apprendi would require us to ask 
whether Mack's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum of 120 months was based on "the fact of a prior 
conviction." As noted above, Mack's enhanced sentence was 
based on two findings made by the District Court: (1) that 
he was an "armed career criminal," and (2) that he had 
"possessed [a] firearm . . . in connection with a crime of 
violence." 
 
The first of these findings is--at least for now, see supra 
note 5--unquestionably valid under Apprendi. Under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, a person is an "armed career 
criminal" if he is "subject to an enhanced sentence under 
the provisions of [the ACCA]." U.S.S.G.S 4B1.4(a). The 
ACCA applies to any person convicted of violating the felon- 
in-possession statute who also "has three previous 
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug 
offense." 18 U.S.C. S 924(e)(1). The terms"violent felony" 
and "serious drug offense" are both defined in the statutory 
text, see id. S 924(e)(2)(A-B), and there has been no 
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suggestion that the felonies for which Mack had previously 
been convicted do not fall within the statutory language. 
 
Apprendi problems arise, however, when the District 
Court's second finding is considered. For Mack to have 
been eligible for any sentence over 235 months, the District 
Court needed also to conclude that Mack had "possessed 
the firearm . . . in connection with a crime of violence." For 
while the ACCA statutorily authorizes a life sentence, see 
Curtis, 511 U.S. at 487, the Sentencing Guidelines operate 
to deprive a district court of the ability to impose it in a 
case such as Mack's. Even with the crime of violence 
enhancement, the maximum sentence allowed by the 
Guidelines would have been 327 months. More precisely, 
with the ACCA enhancement, but without the crime of 
violence enhancement, Mack's offense level would have 
been 33 and his criminal history rating would have been IV. 
See supra Part II. With these ratings, the maximum 
allowable sentence would have been 235 months. See 
U.S.S.G. S 5A. Even with the crime of violence enhancement 
(which raised Mack's offense level to 34 and his criminal 
history rating to VI, see supra Part II), the longest term to 
which the District Court could have sentenced him was 327 
months. See U.S.S.G. S 5A. 
 
In other words, with or without the two sentence 
enhancements, Mack could not have been sentenced to life 
in prison. This is because a defendant with a criminal 
history rating of IV (as Mack would have been without the 
crime of violence enhancement) is not eligible for a life 
sentence unless his or her offense level is at least 39. A 
defendant with a criminal history rating of VI (as Mack was 
after the crime of violence enhancement was applied) is not 
exposed to a potential life sentence unless his or her 
offense level is at least 37. See U.S.S.G.S 5A. There has 
been no suggestion that Mack's offense level was even 
potentially as high as 37, much less 39. 
 
In this case, the District Court found that Mack had 
unlawfully possessed the firearm in connection with the 
shooting of Wessels. While shooting another person would 
unquestionably qualify as a "crime of violence" under the 
Guidelines, see id. S 4B1.2(a)(1), Mack has never been 
charged, must less convicted by a jury, with shooting 
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Wessels.7 As a result, this finding does not fall within the 
"fact of a prior conviction" exception to Apprendi's general 
rule. If this logic is correct, then the maximum allowable 
sentence under Apprendi in this case was 235 months--27 
months less than the 262 month sentence ultimately 
imposed. 
 
There is, so far as I can tell, but one possible response to 
this argument. One could acknowledge that the "prescribed 
statutory maximum" in this case was 120 months and 
concede that Mack's sentence of 262 months exceeded it, 
but nevertheless assert that the (unquestionably valid) 
statutory ACCA enhancement increased Mack's potential 
sentence to life imprisonment. Because the District Court's 
ultimate sentence of 262 months fell within the range that 
could have been authorized by the ACCA finding, the 
argument goes, the sentence does not violate Apprendi. 
 
The question whether a valid sentence enhancement may 
operate to raise the potential as well as the actual sentence 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum has 
not been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court. Neither 
of the Court's recent cases involving the validity of sentence 
enhancements involved two separate enhancements. See 
Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351 (involving a single 
enhancement imposed if the presiding judge concluded that 
"[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a 
purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals 
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual 
orientation or ethnicity" (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:44- 
3(e))); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 
227 (1998) (involving enhancement based on the fact that 
the non-citizen defendant's earlier deportation had been 
"pursuant to" three earlier "convictions for aggravated 
felonies"). 
 
I am not certain of the correct answer to this question. 
The Supreme Court has implied that the "fact of a prior 
conviction" exception should be narrowly construed. Cf. 
Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361 (noting that the exception, 
first enunciated in Almendarez-Torres,"represents at best 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The evidence that Mack shot Wessels was substantial but not 
overwhelming. See slip op. at 3. 
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an exceptional departure from . . . historic practice"). Since 
the Supreme Court has not extended the Almendarez-Torres 
"exception" to cover increases in potential sentences, 
perhaps we should not do so either. 
 
On the other hand, a fairly strong argument can be made 
that an ultimate sentence does not violate the Constitution 
so long as it is within the range of sentences authorized by 
a valid sentence enhancement. The ACCA enhancement 
was valid under Apprendi, and the ACCA statutorily 
authorizes a life sentence. See Curtis, 511 U.S. at 487. But 
for the Sentencing Guidelines, it appears incontestable that 
the District Court would have had discretion, both 
statutorily and constitutionally, to sentence Mack to life 
imprisonment. Since the Sentencing Guidelines are 
themselves a constitutional mechanism for channeling the 
discretion that a sentencing court would otherwise enjoy, 
see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), it can 
certainly be argued that the means by which the Guidelines 
channeled the District Court's discretion in this case do not 
implicate Apprendi. Put differently, the argument is that 
while perhaps Apprendi will come to mean that the 
enhancement for shooting Wessels violates the Constitution 
because it increased Mack's maximum sentence under the 
Guidelines, even if it did not do so under the statute, it has 
not yet acquired that meaning.8 
 
IV. 
 
Having fleshed out the potential Apprendi problem in this 
case, the fact is that neither Mack nor his counsel explicitly 
raised the issue. While it is true that Apprendi  had not 
been decided at the time of the filing of the briefs in this 
case, the argument was certainly available in light of Jones 
v. United States, 536 U.S. 227 (1999). Dicta in Jones stated 
that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. I have acknowledged the plausibility of the argument that the ACCA 
technically did not increase but rather determined Mack's sentence 
because, in cases such as this one, a sentencing judge is not required 
to "pass through" Section 924(a)(1) in order to get to Section 924(e) (the 
ACCA). See supra III.A.2. But for the reasons explained above, collapsing 
the two provisions into one does not alter the fact that they are 
conceptually distinct steps in the Apprendi analysis. 
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       under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
       and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth 
       Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that 
       increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
       charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and 
       proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Id. at 243 n.6. Although we doubtless have the power to do 
so, "[w]e do not generally consider issues not raised by the 
parties." Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 
807, 812 (3d Cir.1991) (en banc). In light of our reluctance 
to make binding decisions about issues not fully briefed 
and argued by the parties, and because I am not certain 
what the proper resolution of any Apprendi challenge to 
Mack's sentence would be, I am content not to decide the 
issue. Accordingly, I am satisfied to join in the opinion and 
judgment of the Court. 
 
I write separately with mixed emotions. In the wake of a 
retroactively unsettling Supreme Court pronouncement 
such as Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995),9 I 
have no desire for a repeat performance, or to contribute to 
the constitutional haze enveloping the appropriate 
relationship between judge and jury in our system of 
criminal justice. I do, however, believe that it has been 
useful to explore one aspect of the Apprendi problem with 
which the judiciary will doubtless soon be required to 
grapple. See supra note 1 (referencing recent Apprendi- 
based filings in this Court). 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. According to a Westlaw KeyCite performed August 30, 2000, Bailey 
has aready been judicially cited 1893 times. It has also led to numerous 
re-sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Goggind, 99 F.3d 
116, 117 (3d Cir. 1996) (involving a procedural posture where Bailey had 
been decided while the case was originally on appeal, which necessitated 
a remand for a new sentencing proceeding). 
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